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Consistency checking in the CSP ‖ B approach veriﬁes that an individual controller process, deﬁned
using a sequential non-divergent subset of CSP, never calls a B operation outside its precondition.
Previously this was done by preprocessing the CSP process to perform a weakest precondition
semantics proof. An embedding of the CSP traces model already exists in the PVS theorem prover,
which makes use of ‘uniform properties’ to deﬁne valid traces. By including a state model we can
extend the notion of uniform properties to deﬁne consistency. In this paper we give a framework
which uses these semantic embeddings to eliminate the need for preprocessing. CSP ‖ B supports
compositional veriﬁcation, and the added beneﬁt of this framework is that rely/guarantee style
decomposition emerges naturally during a proof of consistency.
Keywords: CSP, B, method integration, veriﬁcation
1 Introduction
CSP ‖ B is an approach that has been developing over a number of years. Its
primary goal it to separate state and event based aspects of a speciﬁcation.
We have developed a theoretical framework which centres around the parallel
composition of CSP processes and B machines. This composition is formally
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justiﬁed by Morgan’s failures-divergences semantics for actions system [10],
that can also be applied to B.
Our approach focuses on establishing divergence freedom, deadlock free-
dom and proving safety and liveness properties of particular systems. Ex-
amples of such systems include data-rich protocols and information systems.
The novelty of the approach is that when it is applied in practice all of these
properties can potentially be proved using existing tool support. Morgan’s
notion of divergence freedom and some simple state-based safety properties
could be proved using a theorem prover, while deadlock freedom and other
behavioural properties can be veriﬁed using FDR.
This paper re-examines how consistency (divergence freedom) of CSP ‖ B
speciﬁcations can be veriﬁed with tool support. Without it there is a weakness
in the practical applicability of our approach. It is important that this is
addressed because the theory for all the other properties assumes divergence
freedom. Therefore, even if we can prove the other properties using FDR their
results would only hold if we can also show divergence freedom. Until now,
consistency has been established using a loop invariant technique, which is
described in Section 3 (further details can be found in [15]). In order to make
consistency checking practical, we need to embed this technique into a theorem
prover. This gives rise to several possibilities, some of which have already been
explored. The ﬁrst is to alter one of the commercial toolkits which support
the B-Method. We have considered this but changing the internal workings of
such a tool is not straightforward. We have therefore turned our attention to
general purpose theorem provers to embed the B method. We have attempted
to use an existing shallow embedding of B in PVS [2]. However, this embedding
proved to be too na¨ıve for our purposes, and we are forced to consider deeper
embeddings.
This paper gives our preferred approach to providing tool support for con-
sistency checking using so-called ‘uniform properties’ [9]. It makes use of
an existing PVS embedding of the traces model of CSP, and shows how these
properties need to be extended for CSP ‖ B sequences of operation calls (which
are akin to traces but with state updates).
1.1 Background
An individual CSP ‖ B component (P ‖ M ) comprises a CSP controller pro-
cess P encapsulating a single ﬂow of control for a B machine M . This allows
a clear separation of concerns between the data structures used in a speciﬁca-
tion and the control ﬂow of the events/operations within a speciﬁcation. As
an example, Figure 1 illustrates a controller, called RCtrl, that cycles through
a sequence of operation calls of the Repeater machine. We elaborate on the
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details of the example below, and use it to annotate the theoretical results.
In order to consider the composition of a controller and a machine, the B





Reset =̂ n := 0 ;
Inc =̂ PRE n ≥ 0 THEN n := n + 1 END ;
Do =̂ PRE n > 0 THEN
CHOICE n := n + 1 OR n := n − 1 END
END
END
RCtrl = inc → do → reset → RCtrl
Fig. 1. Example component: skeleton MACHINE and controller
Morgan [10] provides failures/divergences semantics for event systems in
terms of the weakest precondition of a sequence of operation calls. A sequence
of operation calls is a trace of M if it is not guaranteed to block:
Deﬁnition 1.1 M ’s traces are those for which ¬wp(init ;tr , false) holds.
tr is the sequential composition of the operation calls of M , and init is
the initialisation of the system. The CSP trace 〈inc, do, inc, inc, do, reset〉 is
considered to be a trace of the Repeater machine since it is the case that
¬wp(init ;Inc;Do;Inc;Inc;Do;Reset , false) holds. Note that there is a one to
one correspondence between the CSP events and operation calls. In this pa-
per, we are only concerned with non-blocking B operations (i.e. ones without
guards) and therefore all sequences of operation calls are traces. However,
operations called outside their preconditions are not guaranteed to terminate
(i.e. they can diverge). In order to diﬀerentiate between divergent and non-
divergent traces we need to determine whether the sequence is guaranteed
to terminate following initialisation (i.e. establish the postcondition true).
A sequence is a divergence if it is not guaranteed to establish true (e.g.
¬wp(init ;Inc;Do;Do, true)). In this example, the second invocation of the
Do operation may occur in a state where the precondition n > 0 does not
hold (because it is possible to reach a state in which n = 0). A sequence does
not diverge if it is guaranteed to terminate:
Deﬁnition 1.2 M ’s non-divergent traces are those for which wp(init ;tr , true)
holds.
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Since wp(init ;Inc;Do;Reset , true) holds, the trace 〈inc, do, reset〉 is non-
divergent.
2 A New Characterisation of Divergence Freedom
We have seen in Section 1.1 how the non-divergent traces of a B machine are
characterised using the wp notation. In this section we deﬁne an alternative
(but equivalent) characterisation. We use the example in Figure 1 to illustrate
the results of this section.
Properties of recursive data structures such as traces in which the order of
the contents of the data structure is irrelevant have been investigated in [9]
under the classiﬁcation of ‘uniform properties’. Within this classiﬁcation,
we identify a requirement that needs to be true for each element of a trace.
We refer to this as an event predicate. In our case, the event predicate will
capture the requirement that an operation’s precondition holds (as we shall
see in Section 2.2). We shall see in Section 4.3 how the event predicate can be
extended when we consider consistency of multiple, interacting components.
Before we consider consistency using uniform properties, we consider uniform
properties in general.
2.1 Deﬁning Uniform Properties
So-called ‘every’ properties of algebraic datatypes are introduced by Jensen
in [9] to characterise those recursive data structures in which every element
fulﬁls some requirement. For example, for lists of integers, one uniform prop-
erty is that every element of the list must be non-negative. More generally, if
we consider lists then, given a requirement r on the elements of a list l , the





true if l = nil
r(h) ∧ every(r)(t) if l = cons(h, t)
In this deﬁnition, nil denotes the empty list and cons(h, t) denotes a non-
empty list whose ﬁrst element h is suﬃxed by the list t . If we require every
element of a list of integers to be non-negative, for example, then we can deﬁne
r as r(x ) = x ≥ 0. The PVS veriﬁcation system has acknowledged the value
of such properties because ‘every’ properties (and complementary ‘some’ prop-
erties) are generated automatically via its abstract datatype mechanism [12].
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In the context of non-blocking B machines, our characterisation of non-
divergent traces is that every operation must be called within its precondition.
This will depend on the state of the machine when the operation is called as
well as any values input to the operation. Therefore, our characterisation
of the non-divergent traces must keep track of the state as the operations
are executed. Indeed, as operations can be non-deterministic, we must track
sets of states (or, equivalently, predicates on states). Let p(h)(S )(S ′) be the
requirement that operation h is called within its precondition when the state
prior to its execution is contained in S and the resulting state is contained in
S ′. For example, if S is {s | s .n = 1} 3 for state variable n, then executing
Do results in a state S ′ where S ′ = {s | s .n = 2 ∨ s .n = 0}. Then we can
deﬁne the property −−−→every as follows
Deﬁnition 2.2
−−−→every(p)(S )(T )(tr) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
S ⊆ T if tr = nil
∃ S ′.p(h)(S )(S ′) ∧
−−−→every(p)(S ′)(T )(t) if tr = cons(h, t)
The direction of the arrow indicates that we move from the before state
predicate S to the after state predicate T 4 . Thus, for non-empty traces we
are required to ﬁnd an intermediate state predicate S ′ that is reachable by the
operation h and is a suitable before state predicate for the remainder of the
trace t . The relevance of the subset condition S ⊆ T for the empty trace will
become clear in Section 4.2.
It is, of course, possible to give a deﬁnition in which we move from the after
state predicate to the before state predicate. Let p be deﬁned as in −−−→every .
Then we can deﬁne the property ←−−−every as follows
Deﬁnition 2.3
←−−−every(p)(S )(T )(tr) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
S ⊆ T if tr = nil
∃ S ′.p(e)(S ′)(T ) ∧
←−−−every(p)(S )(S ′)(t) if tr = add(t , e)
Here we use an alternative list constructor add such that, given a list t and
an element e, add(t , e) places e at the end of t . Consider T = {s | s .n = 1}.
3 The notation s .n denotes the value of variable n in state s .
4 Here we do not distinguish between sets of states and their characteristic state predicates.
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In order for Inc to reach a state satisfying T , then the before state must satisfy
S ′ where S ′ = {s | s .n = 0}. This deﬁnition will be useful in Section 2.2 to
show the correspondence between this characterisation of non-divergent traces
and the wp deﬁnition given in Section 1.1.
Theorem 2.4 ∀ tr .−−−→every(p)(S )(T )(tr) = ←−−−every(p)(S )(T )(tr)
Proof. Proof by induction on the length of tr . 
Note that we do not give a speciﬁc deﬁnition for p. However, we are
required to make constraints on the possible instances of p. In particular, p is
required to be contravariant with respect to the before state predicate S and
covariant with respect to the after state predicate T . That is
S ′ ⊆ S ∧ T ⊆ T ′ ⇒ (p(e)(S )(T ) ⇒ p(e)(S ′)(T ′))
2.2 A Correspondence Result
In order to show a correspondence between the uniform properties deﬁned
above and the original characterisation of non-divergent traces using the wp
semantics, we have to give speciﬁc instances to p, S and T in ←−−−every(p)(S )(T ).
The reason for using←−−−every is due to the backward nature of wp proofs. That is,
we start with a ﬁnal state predicate and proceed to an initial state predicate.
2.2.1 Termination and Before-After Predicates of Operations.
The wp calculus is syntactic, and the rules for manipulating wp expressions
are deﬁned as axioms. In [1], Abrial deﬁnes a relational model in terms of
two predicates: a termination predicate and a before-after predicate. The
termination predicate characterises the acceptable before states (i.e. the states
that do not cause a divergence). Since an operation call in B corresponds
to a CSP event e, we denote the termination predicate for the operation
call as trm(op(e)), where op(e) denotes e’s corresponding operation. For
example, if s is a state in which n = 1 then trm(Do)(s) = true, whereas
trm(Do)(s ′) = false, if s ′.n = 0.
The before-after predicate characterises the reachable states of an oper-
ation in terms of the state prior to its execution. Since this can be non-
deterministic, the before-after predicate is therefore a relation between before
and after states. Given a CSP event e, we denote the before-after predicate
for the corresponding operation call as prd(op(e)) 5 . For example, since Do is
5 In [1], prd is subscripted by the state variables into which the substitution is ‘plunged’.
For the purposes of this paper, we leave this information implicit.
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non-deterministic, prd(Do) includes the pair (s , s ′) when s .n = 1 and s ′.n = 2,
but also when s .n = 1 and s ′.n = 0.
An operation has input and output parameters. Since these play an im-
portant part in the termination and before-after properties of an operation,
it is important to consider how they are incorporated in trm and prd . Un-
fortunately this is not addressed in suﬃcient detail in [1], so we choose to
model inputs and output parameters via two special state variables inp and
out respectively. Both inp and out range over every operation’s parameters
and, therefore, will be assigned a wide range of values. For example, if an
operation has multiple input parameters then inp will be assigned a tuple of
values. These variables are diﬀerent from normal state variables because, as
we shall see below, their values are relevant for the duration of a single oper-
ation call only. Hence, we do not have to associate unique input/output state
variables for each operation; we simply reuse inp and out .
The termination predicate trm is deﬁned in terms of the normal state
variables and inp only. Intuitively, this is because termination is unaﬀected
by the outputs of an operation. Similarly, the domain of the before-after
predicate prd is deﬁned in terms of the normal state variables and inp, but
the after states deﬁne the resulting values for the normal state variables and
out only. This is because operations should not be able to update the value
of inp.
2.2.2 An Event Predicate.
In the deﬁnitions of −−−→every and ←−−−every , we referred to an event predicate p in
the expression p(e)(S )(S ′). We need to construct a deﬁnition of p such that
←−−−every characterises the non-divergent traces of a process. In terms of the
wp semantics, ←−−−every(p)(S )(T )(tr) should be true for a trace tr if, and only
if, S ⇒ wp(tr ,T ) where tr is the sequential composition of the operation
calls that correspond to the events in tr . That is, the before state predicate
S should be strong enough to guarantee the termination of the sequence of
operation calls and reach a state that satisﬁes T .
To derive a deﬁnition of p, we begin by giving a state predicate equivalent
to wp(f ,T ), for an arbitrary operation call f , deﬁned in terms of trm and prd .
Note that, because f is an operation call, it will have actual parameters corre-
sponding to the operation’s arguments; we denote f ’s actual input parameters
as i(f ), and its actual output parameters as o(f ). Intuitively, wp(f ,T ) is the
weakest predicate such that f is guaranteed to terminate (i.e. not diverge) in
a state that satisﬁes T . In B, state predicates such as T will not refer to the
operation’s arguments 6 . Therefore, the state predicates are concerned with
6 This is not true for reﬁnements, but this is not considered here.
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normal state variables.
Theorem 2.5
wp(f ,T ) = λ s .trm(f )(s WITH inp → i(f )) ∧
∀ s ′.((s WITH inp → i(f ), s ′ WITH out → o(f )) ∈ prd(f ) ⇒ T (s ′))
Proof. Proof using the normal form and deﬁnitions of trm and prd given
in [1]. 
The keyword ‘WITH’ in s WITH inp → i(f ) extends (normal) state s
with special variable inp assigned to the value i(f ), and s ′ WITH out →
o(f ) extends (normal) state s ′ with special variable out assigned to the value
o(f ). Note, if there is no after state with output o(f ) then we get miraculous
behaviour.
By including a before state predicate S , we want to establish results for
expressions of the form S ⇒ wp(f ,T ) which, given an extensional interpreta-
tion of ⇒ for state predicates, requires us to prove
∀ s .S (s) ⇒ (trm(f )(s WITH inp → i(f )) ∧
(∀ s ′.(s WITH inp → i(f ), s ′ WITH out → o(f )) ∈ prd(f ) ⇒ T (s ′)))
In order to show a correspondence between ←−−−every and wp, we therefore deﬁne
p(e)(S )(T ), for event e as follows. Note that the output of e, which we de-
note by o(e), corresponds to the input of the operation op(e). Similarly, the
output of the operation op(e) corresponds to the input of event e, which is
denoted by i(e).
Deﬁnition 2.6
p(e)(S )(T ) = ∀ s .S (s) ⇒ (trm(op(e))(s WITH inp → o(e)) ∧
(∀ s ′.(s WITH inp → o(e), s ′ WITH out → i(e)) ∈ prd(op(e)) ⇒ T (s ′)))
Theorem 2.7
∀ tr .←−−−every(p)(S )(T )(tr) = S ⇒ wp(tr ,T )
Proof. Proof by induction on the length of tr . 
In Section 1.1, non-divergent traces were deﬁned as wp(init ;tr , true). In
wp, the initialisation init deﬁnes the initial set of states. From Theorem 2.7,
the state predicate S characterises the states prior to the execution of tr .
Hence, we can instantiate S with init to obtain the same set of states. Simi-
larly, we can instantiate T with the predicate true to indicate successful ter-




M1 M2 . . .
. . .
Fig. 2. A CSP and B combined system architecture
mination. Thus, ←−−−every(p)(init)(true) characterises non-divergent traces using
uniform properties.
3 CSP and B
In Figure 1 it is clear that the preconditions of the operations hold when
the operations are called by RCtrl . As we stated in Section 1.1, divergent
behaviour can occur by performing repeated Do operation calls since the pre-
condition may not always hold. Previous results [15] have identiﬁed conditions
suﬃcient to guarantee P ‖ M to be divergence free for a recursive controller
P and a machine M . These results require the identiﬁcation of a control loop
invariant (CLI) on the state of the B machine M , which must be true at every
recursive call. The ability to re-establish the CLI means that all operation
calls do not cause a divergence. For example, an appropriate CLI for the
component described in Figure 1 is n = 0.
We can compose individual components together to produce a network of
interacting components. Any interaction between components is restricted
to communication between controllers [13]. Hence, machines cannot commu-
nicate with each other directly, but only via their respective controllers, as
is shown in Figure 2. In addition to control events, controller processes can
now perform events which do not have corresponding B operations. We refer
to these events as communication events. For example, in Figure 3 there
are two communication channels oddpass and evenpass . Channel oddpass
communicates odd values from controller OddCtrl to controller EvenCtrl ,
whereas channel evenpass communicates even values in the opposite direc-
tion. In this example we consider OddCtrl ‖ OddMch as one component and
EvenCtrl ‖ EvenMch as another.
Previous results [13] allow us to establish that a number of Pi ‖ Mi com-
ponents are divergence free once we have shown that each component is diver-
gence free. We use consistency checking for individual components and then,
from the CSP semantics of parallel composition, infer divergence freedom.





oddput oddget evenput evenget
OddCtrl =
oddget?x : N→ oddpass!x → evenpass?y : N→ oddput !(y + 1) → OddCtrl
EvenCtrl =
oddpass?z : N→ evenput !(z+1) → evenget?v : N→ evenpass !v → EvenCtrl
Fig. 3. The odd/even example
4 CSP Rules for Consistency Checking
4.1 A Rule for Event Preﬁxing
The process P = e!x?y : V → P ′(y) behaves by performing the event e that
outputs the value x and binds an input value v of type V to the variable y . It
then behaves as P ′ with v substituted for y . If this process is a controller for
a B machine then it is consistent if P satisﬁes the −−−→every property. The ﬁrst
event in each non-empty trace of P is e.x .v . Hence, P is consistent with its B
machine if, for every possible value v ∈ V , e.x .v satisﬁes the event predicate
p, in which o(e) = x and i(e) = v , and P ′(v) subsequently satisﬁes the −−−→every
property. This motivates the following proof rule
Deﬁnition 4.1 If
∀ y ∈ V . ∃ S ′.p(e)(S )(S ′) ∧ P ′(y) sat −−−→every(p)(S ′)(T )
then
e!x?y : V → P ′(y) sat −−−→every(p)(S )(T )
Note that some values of V may not be output by the corresponding
operation op(e). In these cases, the −−−→every property is satisﬁed miraculously
because the conjunct involving prd in p in Deﬁnition 2.6 is vacuously true.
(This is akin to coercion in [15].)
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4.2 A Fixed Point Rule for Components
In the past, consistency has been proven by translating the controller’s func-
tional into equivalent B notation so that a wp proof can be performed. Con-
sistency checking involves the construction of an invariant on the B state (the
CLI) such that, under the assumption that the CLI holds, the execution of
the translated functional always terminates in a state that re-establishes the
CLI. That is
CLI ⇒ wp(F ,CLI )
where F denotes the translated functional. If, in addition, all possible initial
states satisfy the CLI then the controller and its corresponding B machine are
non-divergent. This is, of course, an instance of ﬁxed point induction, and it
is more succinctly deﬁned in terms of the −−−→every property. If
(∀X .(∀ i .X (i) sat −−−→every(p)(CLI (i))(true)) ⇒
(∀ i .F (X )(i) sat −−−→every(p)(CLI (i))(true)))
where X is of type [index → process], then CLI is an invariant state predicate.
The deﬁnition of −−−→every on the empty trace means that Stop trivially satisﬁes
this property, and we can deduce ∀ i . µ(F )(i) sat −−−→every(p)(CLI (i))(true). If
we can then show that the initial state predicate init implies CLI for the
initial parameter n then, using the contravariance of p, we can deduce
µ(F )(n) sat −−−→every(p)(init)(true)
This gives us suﬃcient conditions for constructing a ﬁxed point rule.
Deﬁnition 4.2 If
∃CLI .init ⊆ CLI (n) ∧
∀X .(∀ i .X (i) sat −−−→every(p)(CLI (i))(true) ⇒
(∀ i .F (X )(i) sat −−−→every(p)(CLI (i))(true)
then
µ(F )(n) sat −−−→every(p)(init)(true)
The two conjuncts in the antecedent correspond to the CLI conditions
deﬁned in [15]. The advantage of using the −−−→every property is that we no
longer need to preprocess the CSP and introduce control variables (and the
substitutions to update them); this is now handled by the structure of the
process itself.
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4.3 A Parallel Rule for Multiple Components
In the previous section, we considered individual components. We now con-
sider the composition of multiple components (as in Figure 2). Parallel com-
position in CSP preserves divergence freedom: if P is divergence free and Q
is divergence free then P ‖ Q is divergence free. This is also true for CSP ‖ B
components: two consistent components put in parallel are consistent. This
is justiﬁed by the following rule
Lemma 4.3 If
P sat −−−→every(p)(S )(T ) ∧
Q sat −−−→every(p)(S ′)(T ′)
then
P ‖ Q sat −−−→every(p)(S ∧ S ′)(T ∧ T ′)
This lemma is true providing the following conditions are met
• the operations controlled by P are disjoint from the operations controlled
by Q
• the state aﬀected by the operations of P is unaﬀected by the operations of
Q (and vice versa)
• the only events common to both P and Q are the communication events
that do not have associated operations and, hence, do not aﬀect the state.
Note that in Section 2.2 the event predicate is deﬁned so that every event
is associated with a B operation. By introducing CSP communication events
that have no corresponding B operations, we need to augment the event pred-
icate p so that we can continue to perform consistency checking under these
new circumstances.
4.4 A Generalised Parallel Rule Incorporating Rely/Guarantee
Lemma 4.3 is suﬃcient to prove divergence freedom, but it is not very useful
in practice. This is because the divergence freedom of one component may
depend (via their synchronisation) on the behaviour of the other components,
as in the example of Figure 3. In general, if one component relies on certain
values being sent on a communication channel, and another synchronising
component can guarantee this, then their parallel composition results in a
divergence free combination.
We can prove that a controller P guarantees the delivery of certain values
on communication channel a by checking the −−−→every property using a strength-
ened event predicate p ′ which, in addition to p, characterises the acceptable
values on a. Conversely, a controller Q that relies on certain values being
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communicated on a should only be checked for consistency when such values
are communicated. This can be achieved by using a weakened event predicate
p ′′ that ignores all undesirable values on a.
Now, if P and Q synchronise on a then, providing the strengthened pred-
icate for P guarantees what Q relies on, the events of their synchronisation
satisfy p. Other synchronisation channels will have their own rely/guarantee
properties which can be used to augment the event predicates further.
Theorem 4.4 (a generalisation of Lemma 4.3). If
P sat −−−→every(p ′)(S )(T ) ∧
Q sat −−−→every(p ′′)(S ′)(T ′)
then
P ‖ Q sat −−−→every(p)(S ∧ S ′)(T ∧ T ′)
5 Proof of odd/even Example
The deﬁnitions in Figure 3 give an immediate partition of the state variables
and operations so that we can prove that OddCtrl ‖ EvenCtrl is consistent
with respect to the machines OddMch and EvenMch: OddCtrl maintains the
value of odd via the operations oddput and oddget, and EvenCtrl maintains
the value of even via the operations evenput and evenget. OddCtrl relies on
even values being received on the synchronising channel evenpass , but guar-
antees that odd values will be sent on the channel oddpass. Hence, in order
to use the rule presented in Theorem 4.4, we construct an event predicate p ′
by extending trm and prd so that
trm(oddpass) = inp mod 2 = 1
prd(oddpass) = {(s , s ′) | s ′ − out = s − inp }
and
trm(evenpass) = true
prd(evenpass) = {(s , s ′) | s ′.out mod 2 = 0 ∧ s ′−out = s− inp }
Similarly, we construct an event predicate p ′′ for EvenCtrl that relies on odd
values being received on oddpass and guarantees that even values will be sent
on evenpass . Therefore, we have two rely/guarantee pairs in this example.
By using the rule for parallel composition, we need to show that
P sat −−−→every(p ′)(initodd )(true)
Q sat −−−→every(p ′′)(initeven)(true)
where initodd characterises the initial values of the variable odd , and initeven
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characterises the initial values of the variable even. Since P is a recursive
process, it is the least ﬁxed point of the following functional F
F (X ) = oddget?x : N→ oddpass!x → evenpass?y : N→ oddput !(y + 1) → X
Hence, we can use the ﬁxed point rule (Deﬁnition 4.2) to show P satisﬁes the
−−−→every property. That is, we must construct a CLI such that
initodd ⊆ CLI ∧
∀X .X sat −−−→every(p ′)(CLI )(true) ⇒ F (X ) sat −−−→every(p ′)(CLI )(true)
Let us deﬁne the CLI to be odd mod 2 = 1. The initialisation of OddMch
assigns the value 1 to odd , which satisﬁes the CLI . Hence, initodd ⊆ CLI .
The second conjunct requires repeated use of the event preﬁxing rule (Deﬁni-
tion 4.1) to show F (X ) sat −−−→every(p ′)(CLI )(true). We start by proving
∀ x ∈ N. ∃S ′.p ′(oddget)(CLI )(S ′)
In a before state satisfying the CLI, it is impossible to retrieve an even value
from oddget. Hence, if x is even then the property is satisﬁed miraculously.
Therefore, it only remains for us to prove the −−−→every property when x is odd.
By observing the deﬁnition of oddget given in Figure 3, we instantiate S ′
with {s | s .odd mod 2 = 1 } to satisfy the event predicate p ′. Now we must
show
oddpass!x → · · · sat −−−→every(p ′)(S ′)(true)
By using the preﬁx rule again, we observe that all states in S ′ meet the termi-
nation requirements of oddpass (i.e. trm(oddpass)) and hence its guarantee.
Since we rely on even values being received on evenpass
evenpass?y → · · · sat −−−→every(p ′)(true)(true)
is miraculous for odd values of y . Hence, we only need to check
oddput(y + 1) → X sat −−−→every(p ′)(true)(true)
for even values of y , . Thus, y + 1 will be odd, which meets the precondition
of oddput. We can now conclude
X sat −−−→every(p ′)(CLI )(true)
and we are ﬁnished. A similar argument proves Q sat−−−→every(p ′′)(initeven)(true).
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6 Putting it Together in PVS
The embedding of the state model in PVS follows Chartier’s embedding in
Isabelle [4]. In PVS, we represent a state as a mapping from a polymor-
phic type NAME (representing variable names) to a polymorphic type VALUE
(representing the entire range of values). Hence, we are not constrained by
particular variable names or particular value types. From this, it is relatively
straightforward to deﬁne the theorems contained in this paper in PVS.
When applying the theorems in practice, we want to be a bit more con-
straining on the range of values that a variable can take. Also, it is easier
to think of states as records rather than mappings: each ﬁeld of the record
is identiﬁed by the name of a variable, whose values could be declared as a
speciﬁc subtype of VALUE. For example, in PVS notation, we declare
Name : TYPE = {x, y, z, inp, out}
Value : DATATYPE
BEGIN
Int(i: int) : Int?
Bool(b: bool) : Bool?
IntBoolpair(p1: int, p2: bool): IntBoolpair?
END Value
Note, we include the parameter variables inp and out. The datatype VALUE
can be seen as a union of types identiﬁed by Int?, Bool?, IntBoolpair?, etc.
Now we can declare a record type State as
[# x: (Int?), y: (Bool?), z: (IntBoolpair?), inp: Value, out: Value #]
Note, inp and out still range over all possible values. Updating a state s can
be done more succinctly by accessing the ﬁelds of s directly (e.g. s‘x denotes
x’s value in s).
In order to make use of the theorems, we use PVS’s type conversion mech-
anism to convert records into mappings. In this example, we must deﬁne a
function C to convert an object of type State to an object of type [NAME ->
VALUE]. Then PVS will use this function to perform the conversion automat-
ically.









N. Evans, H. Treharne / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 145 (2006) 201–217 215
7 Discussion
In this paper we have shown how the uniform property deﬁned in Section 2.1
can be used to characterise divergence freedom of the components of a CSP ‖ B
speciﬁcation. In this setting we have considered sequences of operation calls,
and treated inputs and outputs explicitly. This is simpler than the streaming
of inputs and outputs in [5] because, when considering abstract data types,
sequences of operations are considered (and not their calls).
Recent emerging work has also made use of CSP in the ProB model checker
for B [3]. Thus far it has not focused on decomposition but has examined how a
CSP process can be combined with a B machine. It will be worth investigating
whether the CLI technique can be embedded into ProB. Nonetheless, this work
focuses on state and then the concurrency aspects and allow B to participate in
the controlling of operations. We believe that it is still important to consider
the veriﬁcation of our integrated approach using PVS because in our CSP ‖ B
approach the concurrent architecture is the main driver and the B is acting
more as a data repository. Therefore, work is being undertaken to develop this
framework in PVS so that we can capitalise on the CSP theory that already
exists. The deep embedding of B in PVS will be comparable to the work
of [4] which embeds the relational model of B in the Isabelle/HOL theorem
prover, but it will supersede the shallow embedding of B in PVS [11]. A
PVS embedding of the CSP traces model already exists [7], and this, together
with the new framework, will provide a suite of theories for verifying CSP ‖ B
speciﬁcations.
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